



**University of  
Zurich**<sup>UZH</sup>

**Zurich Open Repository and  
Archive**

University of Zurich  
Main Library  
Strickhofstrasse 39  
CH-8057 Zurich  
[www.zora.uzh.ch](http://www.zora.uzh.ch)

---

Year: 2010

---

## **The new cultural divide and the two-dimensional space in Western Europe**

Bornschier, Simon

**Abstract:** While the endorsement of universalistic values by the New Left led to a first transformation of political space in Western Europe, the counter-mobilization of the extreme populist right resulted in a second transformation in the 1990s. This article focuses on the discursive innovations and normative foundations that have driven the emergence of a conflict opposing libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values. An analysis using data from the media coverage of election campaigns confirms that the New Left and the populist right represent polar normative ideals in France, Austria, and Switzerland. A similar transformation of political space occurred in the absence of a right-wing populist party in Germany, Britain, and the Netherlands. In these contexts, I hypothesize the value conflict to prove less durable and polarizing in the longer run. The analysis of an election in the mid-2000s confirms that party systems evolve in a path dependent manner in the two contexts.

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402381003654387>

Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich

ZORA URL: <https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-41247>

Journal Article

Originally published at:

Bornschier, Simon (2010). The new cultural divide and the two-dimensional space in Western Europe. *West European Politics*, 33(3):419-444.

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402381003654387>

# The New Cultural Divide and the Two-Dimensional Political Space in Western Europe

Simon Bornschier

University of Zurich/European University Institute

## Abstract

While the endorsement of universalistic values by the New Left led to a first transformation of political space in Western Europe, the counter-mobilization of the extreme populist right resulted in a second transformation in the 1990s. This article focuses on the discursive innovations and normative foundations that have driven the emergence of a conflict opposing libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values. An analysis using data from the media coverage of election campaigns confirms that the New Left and the populist right represent polar normative ideals in France, Austria, and Switzerland. A similar transformation of political space occurred in the absence of a right-wing populist party in Germany, Britain, and the Netherlands. In these contexts, I hypothesize the value conflict to prove less durable and polarizing in the longer run. The analysis of an election in the mid-2000s confirms that party systems evolve in a path dependent manner in the two contexts.

In the past decades, new cultural conflicts have become vastly prominent in West European politics. While the New Social Movements of the left first advocated universalistic values in the late 1960s of the past century, a New Right counter-movement that has gained momentum some two decades later. First resulting in the

fading of established partisan loyalties, these new conflicts have been represented by political parties. In this article, I focus on the programmatic innovations of parties and the consequent reshaping of the conflicts represented by party systems at the turn of the century. Furthermore, I assess how durable conflicts centring on cultural liberalism, immigration policies, and European integration are likely to be. In this respect, persisting differences in the nature of conflicts in different countries are to be expected as a result of the way cultural conflicts transformed party systems early on.

The theoretical part of this article provides an account of how New Left and New Right parties have driven the emergence of a new value conflict. The first transformation, which took place in the 1970s, involved the emergence of an opposition between culturally libertarian and traditionalist or authoritarian values. In a second transformation, this conflict has come to centre more explicitly on differing conceptions of community. In normative terms, I argue that libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values form opposing normative ideals and conceptions of justice. Empirically, these two conceptions come to lie at opposing poles of a new dimension of political conflict in West European party systems in the 1990s. With reference to the non-economic content of this dimension, I will refer to it as the new cultural divide. With the traditional distributional conflict well and alive, this results in a two-dimensional competitive space. In France, Switzerland, and Austria, extreme right-wing populist parties have triggered the manifestation of the new cultural divide, while it has emerged as a result of the strategic moves of the established parties in Germany, Britain, and the Netherlands. Whether or not a right-wing populist party was able to entrench itself in the crucial phase of the late-1980s or early-1990s has important implications for the durability and for the virulence of the new cultural conflict, however.

These claims are empirically verified in an analysis of the dimensionality of political space in the 1970s, the 1990s, and the first years of the new millennium. This inquiry relies on data on party positions derived from the news coverage of election campaigns. This article extends earlier analyses (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008) to a more recent election in each of the six countries, and allows parties and issues to be located in the political space by means of Multidimensional Scaling (MDS). Using this data, I investigate how the dimensions underlying political competition have evolved between the 1970s and the mid-2000s.<sup>(1)</sup> This allows me to assess, first, how resilient

the cultural conflicts will prove, and second, to verify the frequent claim that they are likely to be integrated into the traditional left-right dimension.

The article is structured as follows. After a brief discussion of the forces underlying recent evolutions in West European party systems, I focus on the ideologies that parties have used to mobilize the new cultural conflict. Section two develops hypotheses on how the new conflicts are likely to manifest themselves in the transformation of political space, depending on the context of the national party system. I then present the research design and the data used in the empirical analysis, the results of which are presented in the final section. The analysis will allow an over-time tracking of the two-fold transformation of political space. Given the postulated divergence between party systems in the 2000s, and because this data has hitherto not been analyzed, I will put special emphasis on the patterns of opposition in the most recent contest.

## The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe

There is some disagreement regarding the sources of the recent transformations of West European party systems. As pointed out by Enyedi and Deegan-Krause in the introduction to this issue, parallel to the dealignment of traditional class and religious cleavages, there are also processes of realignment that are driven by new structural antagonisms. As pointed out by Allardt (1968) early on, the educational revolution of the 1960s has spurred a growing diffusion of universalistic outlooks that citizens with more traditionalist values and conceptions of community are likely to see as threatening. On the other hand, Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008) argue that the educational revolution interacts with processes of denationalization or globalization to create “winners” and “losers” of the modernization processes of the past decades (on these two views see also the contributions by Dolezal and by Stubager, this issue).

One may debate the relative contribution of economic modernization, spurred by globalization, and cultural modernization since the late 1960s in party system change. As a result of these evolutions certain social groups have lost in terms of life-chances or privileges, while others feel threatened in their identity by the policies enacting universalistic values and by European integration. One of the most striking outcomes of these large-scale changes has been that the resulting political potentials have at

least until recently not been mobilized in economic terms. Rather, they have been tied to cultural conflicts that emerged in the aftermath of 1968. In this contribution, I leave the evolving structural underpinnings of party choices in Western Europe aside for the moment. Instead, I focus on the political conflicts themselves that have triggered these processes of dealignment and realignment. If cleavages involve social structural groups with shared identities that allow them to act collectively, as defined by Bartolini and Mair (1990), then ideologies are likely to play a dual role from a cleavage perspective. On the one hand, conflict along established divisions keeps alive existing collective identities and thereby perpetuates alignments between social groups and parties. Novel ideologies, on the other hand, are crucial in the political articulation of new potentials rooted in an evolving social structure. Common social structural positions are unlikely to result in collective identifications as a matter of course. Instead, the latter are to some degree shaped from above by political actors that seek to establish durable links between themselves and segments of society (Bornschiefer forthcoming a).

In the late 1960s and 1970s, new political issues came up that had more to do with values and life-styles than with traditional, distributional conflicts. The mobilization of the New Social Movements of the 1960s and 1970s – fighting, for example, for feminist and gay rights, for the right to abortion and for the recognition of minorities and alternative life-styles – brought these new issues onto the political agenda, resulting in a two-dimensional structure in West European party systems, as Kitschelt (1994) has shown. Cutting across the “old” distributional axis, a cultural line of conflict opposing libertarian and authoritarian values had come to structure the attitudes of voters. On the political left, the prominence of cultural liberalism has given rise to the establishment of Ecologist parties and a transformation of a number of Social Democratic parties early on in the 1980s.

An opposing set of norms and values that constituted a counter-potential to the libertarian movements was detectable at the attitudinal level early on in Western publics (Sacchi 1998). Its political manifestation, however, was delayed as compared to that of the New Left. The discomfort with the cultural changes brought about by the New Left was essentially conservative, and ideologically diffuse (see also Flanagan and Lee 2003). Consequently, the political manifestation of the anti-universalistic potential was less the result of a grass-roots mobilization in social movements, as had

been the case for the New Left, but depended more heavily on political leadership. In particular, political actors had to find specific issues around which a common identity could be established and that could serve to mobilize the traditionalist potential. In the 1990s, right-wing populist parties in a number of European countries succeeded in putting themes on the political agenda that disrupted older collective identities based on class and religion. This is important since the mobilization space of new conflicts is conditioned by the political identities tied to the established cleavages (Bornschiefer forthcoming a). As a consequence, and despite their diverse origins, right-wing populist parties have converged on a programmatic profile that involves two elements: First, they challenge the societal changes brought about by the libertarian left, and question the legitimacy of political decisions that enact universalistic values. Second, and more importantly, the populist right has promoted new issues and developed new discourses, for example concerning immigration. This does not involve ethnic racism, but rather what Betz (2004) and Betz and Johnson (2004) have called “differentialist nativism” or “cultural differentialism”, which represents a counter-vision to multicultural models of society.

The early literature emphasized the diversity of ideological appeals of parties of the extreme right (e.g., Kitschelt and McGann 1995), and while some of these differences can be shown to persist (e.g., Golder 2003, Carter 2005, Cole 2005, Mudde 2007), the successful exponents of this group have converged on the programmatic profile outlined above. By virtue of their specific programmatic profile, as well a number of further attributes, extreme right-wing populist parties represent a common party family that forms an ideologically more moderate sub-group of the broader extreme right category (Bornschiefer forthcoming a).(2) While the New Left has triggered a first transformation of political space in the 1970s and 1980s, the mobilization of the populist right has thus been the driving force of a second transformation. Depending on the country, the latter took place either in the late 1980s or in the 1990s, as the analysis will show (see also Kriesi et al. 2006).

As a result, the issues advocated by the New Left and the populist right now lie at opposing poles of a new line of conflict that I propose to label libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian.(3) This opposition is, at heart, a conflict over the role of community. It is at the centre of the well-known philosophical debate between liberals and communitarians, opposing individualist and

communitarian conceptions of the person. As communitarians such as Walzer (1983) and Taylor (1992) argue, universalistic principles may violate cultural traditions within an established community. If humans are inherently social beings, the application of universalistic principles may lead to political solutions that clash with established and widely shared cultural practices. Communitarians urge us to acknowledge the fact that our identities are grounded in cultural traditions, and that an individualistic conception of the self is misconceived.

Although many communitarian thinkers only propose a (more or less modest) communitarian corrective to liberal universalism, this debate has provided theoretical grounds for a more far-reaching critique of the universalistic principles advocated by Rawls (1971). Philosophical currents of the European New Right have borrowed from communitarian conceptions of community and justice in their propagation of the concept of “cultural differentialism”, claiming not the superiority of any nationality or race, but instead stressing the right of peoples to preserve their distinctive traditions. In turn, this discourse has proved highly influential for right-wing populist parties (Antonio 2000, Minkenberg 2000, Birnbaum 1996). Immigration is directly linked to this conception since the inflow of people from other cultural backgrounds endangers the cultural homogeneity that thinkers of the New Right, as well as exponents of right-wing populist parties deem necessary to preserve. Equally present in communitarian thinking and in the discourse of the populist right is a defence of the primacy of democratic majority decisions over abstract normative principles. From a theoretical point of view, then, New Left and New Right positions represent polar normative ideals.<sup>(4)</sup> Empirically, I therefore expect the defence of cultural tradition and the rejection of multicultural society to form one pole of the new cultural divide in political space, while cultural liberalism and universalistic conceptions of community constitute the opposing pole.

## The Advent of a Two-Dimensional Political Space: Hypotheses

Many European countries have been stamped by more than just the state-market cleavage, most notably the religious cleavage that has represented the second common structuring element of European party systems. Consequently, political space in multiparty systems may well have been two-dimensional already before the New Left

transformation of social democratic parties. Flanagan and Lee (2003) explicitly relate today's "culture wars" to an opposition between religious and increasingly secular and individualistic worldviews. More than the advent of a fundamentally new dimension of conflict, then, we are likely to have witnessed a shift in the substantive content of the cultural or religious dimension, and of the relative salience of the economic and cultural divides. In the 1970s, where the empirical analysis will begin, I expect a situation in which the cultural issues put on the agenda by the New Left have resulted in a first restructuring of political space, leading to a divide between libertarian and authoritarian or traditionalist values. As a consequence of the emergence of a communitarian conception of community opposed to the universalistic one, I expect this divide to have been transformed anew in the late 1980s and early 1990s, resulting in an opposition between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values.

Although parties of the established right first put the issue of immigration on the political agenda in the 1980s, as pointed out by Ignazi (1992, 2003), only right-wing populist parties practice an elaborate traditionalist-communitarian discourse that combines opposition against universalistic values with an exclusionist conception of community. Consequently, while the immigration issue has been a prominent one in most of Western Europe in the 1990s, resulting in a commonality of the party political space (see Bornschier 2005 and Kriesi et al. 2006), I expect party systems with a significant right-wing populist party to follow a different trajectory in the 2000s than party systems where this has not been the case. The reason is that a firmly entrenched right-wing populist party can keep questions of community and tradition on the political agenda, while they may lose in importance otherwise. Where the established parties were able to avert the entry of a party of the populist right, economic issues may thus make a comeback, partly due to unpopular reforms of the welfare state pursued by left-wing parties in government. A position of economic protectionism seems to convey considerable potential for parties off the left-wing mainstream. Apart from Germany, the recent success of the Socialist Party in the Netherlands also fits this pattern.

Consequently, we can expect differences in the lines of conflict that structure political space that stem from the configuration of the party system. But the resulting dimensionality of political space is open to yet another source of variation. If voter



preferences are more than one-dimensional, then the dimensionality of the party political space will depend on the specific way parties combine positions along the relevant lines of conflict (see also Stoll's analysis of "raw" and "effective" party-defined spaces, this issue). If party positions along the cultural line of conflict were to coincide with their stances regarding the state-market cleavage, a one-dimensional political space would emerge. The more party positions on the two dimensions diverge, on the other hand, the more strongly two-dimensional the resulting political space will be.

## Research Design

The ensuing analysis focuses on six countries, namely, France, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, and Britain. These countries differ with respect to many institutional, societal and political characteristics, such as their size or regarding their political institutions. For all these differences, I expect similar cultural conflicts to have asserted themselves since the late-1960s due to social changes characteristic of advanced industrial countries. Consequently, we should be able to witness a similar two-fold transformation of political space. The analysis starts by looking at 1970s elections in the six countries, where I expect the first transformation to have occurred. I then move to the first election in the late-1980s or early-1990s for which data is available in order to trace the second transformation. Despite the basic commonality of the development in the six countries, I also expect differences between them. The party system filters the mobilization of political potentials, and different actors are likely to be the driving forces of the transformations. This is likely to have implications for the capacity of the cultural divide to "freeze" party systems, and the six countries present some interesting variation in this respect: A new party of the populist right has emerged in France, Switzerland and Austria, but not in Germany, the Netherlands, or Britain. Fresh data from the most recent election in each country serves to assess whether conflicts evolve differently in these two contexts.

To identify the lines of conflict structuring political competition, I use media data based on an analysis of parties' "political offer" in election campaigns. In each country, all articles related to the electoral contest or politics in general were selected from a quality newspaper and a tabloid, covering the last two months before Election Day. These newspapers analyzed are *Die Presse* and *Kronenzeitung* in Austria, *Le*

*Monde* and *le Parisien* for France, *NRC Handelsblad* and *Algemeen Dagblad* in the Netherlands, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* and *Blick* for Switzerland, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Bild* in Germany, and *The Times* and *The Sun* in Britain. The articles were coded sentence-by-sentence using a method developed by Kleinnijenhuis and his colleagues (see Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings 2001; for a fuller description of the coding procedure and data used for the present article, see Dolezal 2008). The choice of this data has advantages as well as disadvantages. Newspapers often have a specific partisan bias, and may give more room to some contenders and less to others. This would above all be a problem for an analysis based exclusively on issue *saliency*, however. Partisan bias is far less problematic for the coding scheme used here, which determines party positions in terms of a positive or negative *direction* of parties concerning issues. The data predominantly captures statements that party exponents make at press conferences and on other occasions, and it is unlikely that newspapers twist these statements to a degree that affects the validity of the measurement.

The advantages of this data over expert survey data are clear. Because small political formations such as right-wing populist parties may not have marked profiles concerning all issue dimensions, expert surveys risk to produce data that is biased by theoretical expectations regarding parties' positions. An obvious disadvantage of the campaign data compared to that based on manifestoes (Budge et al. 2001, Klingemann et al. 2006) is that it covers only a relatively limited time-span. There is an important advantage over both alternative data sources, however, being that the campaign data more closely reflects what voters actually learn of the parties' positions. The data is therefore more situational, which is advantageous for the scope of this analysis. Because the populist right has succeeded in setting the media agenda in recent years, it has forced even those parties to take positions regarding immigration and traditionalist-communitarian values that were more occupied with other issues. In these cases, deriving positional measures from saliency is potentially misleading. Hence, the media data offer information both on the *position* of parties regarding issues, as well as on their relative *saliency*. Using Weighted Metric Multidimensional Scaling, both are taken into account to create graphical representations of political space.

The political issues put forward by parties in these campaigns are regrouped into 12 broader categories that relate to the research questions at hand. In the following,

the content of these categories is specified. All categories have a clear direction, and actor's stance towards them can be either positive or negative. The abbreviations in brackets refer to the ones used in the figures later on:

#### Economic issues

- *Welfare*: Expansion of the welfare state and defence against welfare state retrenchment. Tax reforms that have redistributive effects, employment and health care programs.
- *Budget*: Budgetary rigor and tax reductions that have no redistributive effects.
- *Economic liberalism (ecolib)*: Opposition to market regulation, support for deregulation, for more competition, and privatisation.

#### Cultural issues

- *Cultural liberalism (cultlib)*: Support for the goals of the New Social Movements: Peace, solidarity with the third world, gender equality, human rights. Support for cultural diversity and international cooperation. Opposition to racism, support for the right to abortion and euthanasia, for a liberal drug policy etc. The category includes the opposite concept of *cultural protectionism*, coded inversely: Patriotism, calls for national solidarity, defence of tradition and national sovereignty, traditional moral values.
- *Europe*: Support for European integration (including enlargement) or EU-membership in the case of Switzerland and Austria prior to 1995.
- *Culture*: Support for education, culture, and scientific research.
- *Immigration*: Support for a tough immigration and integration policy, and for the restriction of the number of foreigners.
- *Army*: Support for a strong national defence and for nuclear weapons.
- *Security*: Support for more law and order, fight against criminality.

#### Residual categories

- *Environment (eco)*: Calls for environmental protection, opposition to atomic energy.
- *Institutional reform (iref)*: Support for various institutional reforms such as the extension of direct democratic rights or calls for the efficiency of the public administration.
- *Infrastructure (infra)*: Support for the improvement of the infrastructure.

The grouping of the issues into economic, cultural, and residual categories is provided for illustrative purposes only and does not determine the analysis. The distances between parties and issue categories are analysed separately for each country and for each election using Multidimensional Scaling (MDS). The MDS technique first assesses how many dimensions are necessary to represent the parties and issues, using as few dimensions as possible. Having determined the dimensionality, the method then represents objects graphically according to the proximity between them (see Coxon 1982, Rabinowitz 1975). It is important to note that the only information conveyed in the resulting configurations is the *relative* proximity between objects (i.e., the absolute distances in the figures cannot be compared). The solution can be freely rotated, and the configurations shown in the following section have been arranged to make the antagonism between state and market to lie horizontally in political space. While it is possible to lay axes into the solution in order to more easily grasp what the main conflicts are about, the representations do not lend themselves to a dimensional interpretation. This is because the location of parties results from their positions regarding all relevant issue categories. To give an example, parties of the New Left may not lie exactly next to the cultural liberalism category because their position regarding the distributional state-market conflict “pulls” them in a different direction. There are thus always distortions between the “real” distances and their graphical representation in the political space. Employing Weighted Metric Multidimensional Scaling ensures, however, that the distances with respect to salient issues or parties will be more accurate than less salient ones. While it is intuitively plausible that the representation of the competitive political space should mirror the most salient conflicts in the party system, this procedure has one drawback: Parties may misleadingly be located in proximity to issues they are not in favour of, but did not strongly voice an opinion on, because these distances will play a minor role in determining the political space resulting from MDS. For these reasons, it is indispensable occasionally to refer to the original, undistorted distances in the data on which the MDS-analysis is based. Tables indicating the party positions and issue saliency can be found in the Appendix. Note that certain issues and parties are dropped from the analysis due to their limited presence in the media, and thus do not appear in the figures.

The Stress-I statistic, which is indicated below Figures 1 to 6, is a measure of badness-of-fit. The closer this value is to zero, the better the low-dimensional representation fits the original data. There are no generally applicable rules as to what constitutes an acceptable fit, not least because the graphical representation of political space is always a simplification of a more complex reality. While the goodness-of-fit may vary from one election to another, MDS does tell us reliably how many dimensions are necessary to represent political space.

## The Transformation of West European Political Space from the 1970s to the mid-2000s

In all elections under study, political space proves to be clearly two-dimensional, since the move from a one-dimensional to a two-dimensional representation results in the clearest improvement in the goodness-of-fit of the solution. A constant finding across countries and elections is that an antagonism between welfare provision and economic liberalism emerges as the political manifestation of the state-market cleavage forms one of these dimensions. While the traditional distributive conflict thus remains polarizing – or indeed in many instances has become more polarized than was the case in the 1970s –, the second dimension of opposition in political space has been subject to change. In the following, I focus primarily on this transformation. Because the results reveal a common evolution in terms of the impact of cultural conflicts on political space from the 1970s to the 1990s, but a divergence thereafter, I present figures that present a cross-sectional view of political space at three time-points, namely, the mid-1970s, the late-1980s or early-1990s, and the 2000s. For reasons of space, I will focus rather narrowly on the core hypotheses advanced in the theoretical section and omit a discussion of the location of the other issue categories and less relevant parties.

In the 1970s, cultural liberalism, which regroups the issues relating to the goals of the New Social Movements, has appeared on the political agenda, as Figures 1 and 2 show. The libertarian-universalistic pole of the new cultural divide already structures party positions in all six countries. Except for Switzerland, this category occupies a rather extreme position, which is an indicator of polarization. Generally, Socialist or Social Democrat parties of the left most strongly endorse these goals, indicating that

they have undergone a New Left transformation. This is the case of the PSF in France, the SPD in Germany, the SPÖ in Austria, and to a more limited degree of the Labour Party in Britain. While the Dutch PvdA occupies a similar position, it already faces competition from new parties mobilizing universalistic values, namely the Green-Left party and D66. The entry of competitors within the New Left has thus occurred early in the Netherlands, but the other countries have followed suit, as we shall see later. Finally, in Germany, the SPD's liberal democrat coalition partner occupies a position in similar vicinity to cultural liberalism and the same is true of the Christian Democrats in Switzerland.

Figures 1 & 2 about here

Depending on the country, the counter-pole of the cultural dimension is formed either by budgetary rigor, support for the army, or by law and order stances ("security"), or by a combination of these. The antagonism between cultural liberalism and budgetary rigor may be interpreted as a neo-conservative anti-state position, which is liberal in economic terms and traditionalist in cultural matters (see Habermas 1985, Eatwell 1989). Support for the army or law and order, on the other hand, reflects a traditionalist or authoritarian position that is in line with the expectations set out regarding the nature of the cultural divide in the 1970s. Conservative parties lie closest to the authoritarian or traditionalist pole, most clearly in the cases of the CDU in Germany and the Gaullist RPR in France. In the Netherlands, the liberal VVD and CDA lie furthest away from cultural liberalism, but their traditionalist position is less clear-cut than in the countries just discussed, and the same is true of the Conservatives in Britain. Note that in both countries, there is an issue category that lies even further away than security, but this is not due to strong polarization, but rather to the fact that all parties reject European integration in the British and a strong army in the Dutch case (see the party positions in the Appendix). Finally, and interestingly, the two parties that later underwent a transformation to a right-wing populist party already in the 1970s lie at the traditionalist pole of the cultural divide. The Swiss People's Party (SVP) is staunchly anti-universalistic and culturally conservative, and the same is true of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ).

The Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) takes a much more centrist position compared to the FPÖ. While both the mainstream left and right in Austria are clearly situated on the left of the state-market cleavage, they differ not only with respect to cultural liberalism, but also due to the ÖVP's calls for budgetary rigor and cutting back the state.

A second transformation of political space occurs between the 1970s and the 1990s as a result of the redefinition of the cultural dimension of conflict, as Figures 3 and 4 show.<sup>(5)</sup> The appearance of the immigration issue on the political agenda marks the emergence of a full-fledged opposition between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values in every country but Britain, where a configuration typical of the 1970s continues to prevail. In some countries, this results in an antagonism between the New Left and the populist right, while in others, established conservative parties are situated rather close to the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the new cultural divide. I start off by discussing those cases where a right-wing populist party drove the transformation, and indeed also stood to benefit most from it.

Figures 3 about here

In France, the mainstream right backed off from its resistance against libertarian-universalistic values, and together with the Front National's programmatic innovation, this has resulted in the populist right replacing the mainstream right as the antagonist of the New Left. In Switzerland and Austria, established parties have come to adopt a profile similar to that of the Front National. Both the Austrian Freedom Party and the Swiss People's Party are situated at the traditionalist-communitarian extreme of the transformed cultural dimension. In Switzerland, the SVP is located close to the various smaller parties of the extreme right parties, which in this election still gained a sizable share of the vote. Competing with a better-funded party and a charismatic leader, the electoral fate of the extreme right parties was dull after the SVP's exploitation of the themes of European integration and immigration. After their high in 1991, they virtually collapsed under the mobilization efforts of the SVP. Similarly to the Swiss case, Jörg Haider's FPÖ adopted a hierarchical internal organization and

a strong anti-establishment discourse, which allowed him to capitalize first on economic liberalism and later on the questions of immigration and identity. Among the parties studied in this article, the Front National, the SVP, and the FPÖ thus qualify as members of the extreme right-wing populist party family (for a more detailed discussion, see Bornschier forthcoming a).

In all of these cases, the mainstream competitors of the populist right have reacted to the latter's success by taking up some of its core issues and positions. In France, this has led the Gaullist RPR and the UDF to adopt an incoherent profile that combines an endorsement of universalistic values with restrictive immigration stances (see Appendix). This results in their centrist position in Figure 3. The Swiss liberals pursue a similar strategy due to the substantial voter shares they have lost to the SVP as a consequence of the prominence of the new cultural conflict. In neither case did this prevent the success of the extreme populist right, however, which relies on a much more coherent traditionalist-communitarian ideology. Clearly, then, right-wing populist parties are not single-issue parties that thrive solely on the immigration issue, as Mudde (1996) has argued some time ago, and contrary to what Ivarsflaten's (2008) asserts. The similar effort of the Social Democrats and the ÖVP in Austria to adopt not only tougher stances on immigration, but also calls for law and order, has not contained the FPÖ's success either. Rather, participation in government has been detrimental to the populist right in Austria. The results shown in Figure 3 indicate that the ÖVP and the FPÖ differ rather strongly with respect to their state-market position. The ÖVP's ability to force the FPÖ into a rather liberal economic policy, which goes against the preferences of the latter's core constituencies, goes part of the way in explaining the FPÖ's subsequent losses.

The Swiss configuration is a partial exception to the pattern found in France and Austria due to the extraordinary role that conflicts over Europe has played in the 1991 election, one year before the referendum regarding membership in the European Economic Area. Its staunch opposition against European integration has catalyzed the success of the Swiss People's Party (SVP), and in this election, Europe forms the counter-pole to traditionalism and communitarianism. Cultural liberalism lies at a similar distance from the immigration category, but the antagonism formed by these two issues runs parallel and therefore overlaps completely with the state-market dimension. The fact that support for European integration and cultural liberalism do



not go hand-in-hand, as we would expect, is due to the fact that European integration faced opposition both from the populist right and from the Ecologists in this election. Despite their clearly libertarian-universalistic profile, the Swiss Greens initially opposed forging closer bonds with the EU because they were concerned that this would dilute Switzerland's achievements in environmental protection. This has also led members of this party family in Scandinavia to oppose European integration (Jahn 1999, Johansson and Raunio 2001). In later elections, however, the Swiss Ecologists rallied behind a pro-European position in the later contests, and the Swiss configuration comes to resemble the continental European mainstream, as we shall see.

As mentioned, the British political space in the early-1990s, shown in Figure 4, still resembles that of the 1974 election due to the absence of the immigration issue. In the two other countries that have not seen successful right-wing populist challengers, on the other hand, a transformation of political space similar to that in France, Austria, and Switzerland has occurred. This is consequent of the adoption of the immigration issue by established parties of the right, similarly to what had already occurred in the early 1980s (Ignazi 2003). Confronted with large numbers of migrants and refugees from Eastern Europe and former Yugoslavia, and with a wave of extreme right activism and violence, the German Union parties argued that the "threshold of tolerance" and of the capacity to assimilate foreigners had been reached. While calling for a more restrictive immigration policy, the Union's position is somewhat less extreme than that of the populist right in other countries, and not that different from that of the Social Democrats. The latter have clearly abandoned the universalistic position they had held in the seventies. In the German case, the resulting centripetal pattern of competition between the two major parties contained the salience of the immigration issue, and helped to inhibit the emergence of a right-wing populist party (Bornschier forthcoming a). In the Netherlands, the VVD is both most distant from cultural liberalism and most strongly calls for a tough immigration policy. While its remote position with respect to the other parties leaves little space for a right-wing populist competitor, this strategy did contribute to keeping the immigration issue on the political agenda. The cultural divide thus remained virulent in later elections, contributing to Pim Fortuyn's success in 2002.

Figure 4 about here

In all six countries, parties of the New Left continue to occupy the libertarian-universalistic pole of the new divide. Staying true to their universalistic convictions, the rejection of the tough immigration policies advocated by the populist right has thus become assimilated into their profile. However, the established Socialist or Social Democrat parties now face competition from Ecologist parties in mobilizing voters with universalistic values, and have even lost their New Left profile in some cases. Ecologist parties now exhibit the most clearly libertarian-universalistic profile in Germany, France, the Netherlands, and in Austria. The same is true of the Liberal Democrats in Britain and for the short-lived Liberal Forum in Austria.

The results so far thus confirm the proposition that the issues put on the political agenda by the New Left and of the populist right constitute polar normative ideals. At the same time, the basic structure of political space is similar whether or not a right-wing populist party has established itself. This is due to the divisions over cultural liberalism on the one hand, and to the emergence of the immigration issue as a counter-pole to cultural liberalism in all cases except for Britain. Yet, even if the Dutch VVD and the German Union parties showed some reluctance concerning libertarian universalism and favoured tough immigration policies in the mid-1990s, neither of them qualifies as a member of the right-wing populist party family. Clearly, they lack the anti-establishment discourse typical of the populist right and have retained a pluralist party organization. And there is an important further difference: Because the populist right thrives on the hard core of the traditionalist-communitarian voter potential, it will scarcely survive a moderation of its discourse. Mainstream parties of the right, on the other hand, have more leeway to abandon those elements of the populist right's discourse they adopted either to outbid their mainstream right competitors, or to crowd out extreme right-wing populist parties. The discussion over immigration and asylum seekers was there to grasp in the 1990s and this therefore constituted a crucial phase with long-term implications. The hypothesis that the nature of cultural conflicts differs depending on whether or not a right-wing populist party succeeded in breaking into party systems is verified in the most recent electoral contest.

The latest elections covered by the campaign data took place roughly twelve years after those just discussed, and almost twenty in the case of France due to the length of presidential terms. As before, I start with the discussion of the Austrian, Swiss and French cases, presented in Figure 5. Conforming to expectations, party positions remain polarized along the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian dimension in those countries where a right-wing populist party is present. In Switzerland, the declining salience of the European integration issue makes the Swiss configuration come to resemble that of the other two countries. This is largely the result of the Ecologists having converged on the pro-European position typical of New Left voters in continental Europe (though not in Scandinavia, see Bornschier forthcoming b). In each of the three countries, the cultural divide cuts across the state-market cleavage very clearly, indicating that party positions along the two dimensions are not strongly related.

Figure 5 about here

In Austria, the FPÖ under the leadership of Hans-Christian Strache occupies a much more unambiguously traditionalist-communitarian position than Haider's new party, the "Alliance for the Future of Austria" (BZÖ). The latter's position in this election is no longer typical of successful right-wing populist parties, which may well explain its meagre electoral showing. Another new party, the "List Dr. Martin" seems to mobilize outside the dominant dimensions of opposition with its calls for political transparency, democracy, and justice. Compared to earlier contests, the ÖVP has changed its strategy vis-à-vis its right-wing populist competitors, and has come to occupy a more universalistic position. The ÖVP is less supportive of cultural liberalism than the SPÖ and much less so than the Ecologists, however, and its somewhat unexpected location is due its position on Europe (see Appendix). In a campaign in which debates over Europe centred on Turkey's accession to the Union, the ÖVP remained the only party supportive of the integration process.

In France, the Front National retains a distinctive position at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the cultural divide. The most interesting evolution here concerns the mainstream parties, whose positions have evolved considerably. In

particular, it is striking to which degree the Socialists have backed off from their New Left position under Ségolène Royal's candidacy. The mainstream left is only moderately more in favour of cultural liberalism than the Gaullists, and takes an intermediate stance on immigration. Nicholas Sarkozy as the Gaullist candidate took a somewhat tougher stance on immigration than Royal, and this is even more true of Bayrou's UDF, as the proximity figures reveal (see Appendix). This is not mirrored in Figure 5 due to the Royal's strong endorsement of environmental protection, however. For the same reason, the configuration resulting from the MDS analysis does not do justice to the fact that the Ecologists by far retain the most libertarian-universalistic profile. Despite these limitations, it is safe to say that, contrary to widespread perceptions, Sarkozy has not moved the Gaullist UMP dramatically closer to the populist right than was the case in 1988. Rather, 2002 was the exception, when Jacques Chirac defended an unusually universalistic position (see Bornschier 2008), and in this sense, Sarkozy did perform a turnaround. This implies, however, that the large number of former Front National voters that deserted Le Pen in favour of Sarkozy (see Mayer 2007) were not driven by the conviction that the mainstream right had adopted the Front National's profile. Rather, they seem to have done so because of the personal characteristics and the credibility of the Gaullist candidate.

Turning to the three countries that have not seen a breakthrough of a party of the populist right, Figure 6 reveals two different patterns: The first is the British trajectory, which follows a development found much earlier in the other countries, while the second is that of the Netherlands and Germany, where cultural conflicts have lost some of their virulence. Later than conservative or liberal parties in Germany and the Netherlands, the British Conservatives have put the immigration issue on the political agenda in the 2005 campaign. As a consequence, the British political space displays a cultural conflict that centres more explicitly on differing conceptions of community than was the case earlier on. The Conservatives are situated at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the cultural divide, and while Labour's position is somewhat indeterminate, the Liberal Democrats occupy the libertarian-universalistic pole. A partial integration of the two divides is evident, but the political space is clearly more than one-dimensional: What sets the Liberal Democrats and the other two parties apart is not so much their position with respect to the economic dimension, but the cultural conflict.

Figure 6 about here

In the 1990s, the Christian Democratic Union parties in Germany exhibited a traditionalist-communitarian profile similar to that of the British Conservatives in 2005. This move it proved transitory, however, as the German configuration in 2005 reveals. The Asylum compromise between the Union parties and the SPD ousted the immigration issue from the political agenda, and no party campaigned on restrictive migration policies in 2005. With no competitor that keeps the anti-universalistic and anti-immigrant discourse alive, the Union parties were free to adopt a centrist position along the cultural line of conflict. As a result, party positions are no longer strongly structured by the cultural dimension. Rather, the competition within the left sparked off by the countrywide appeal of the newly founded Left Party has led to a stronger polarization in terms of economic policy making.(6)

Finally, in the Netherlands a successful right-wing populist party is also absent. The List Pim Fortuyn did compete in this election, but it received almost no media coverage. More importantly, due to Fortuyn's adherence to universalistic values, the LPF's programmatic position in earlier elections differed significantly from that of right-wing populist parties. This finding emerges both from an analysis based on the media data also employed in this article (Bornschiefer forthcoming a), as well as in Pennings and Keman's (2003) analysis based on manifesto data. Geert Wilders' Freedom Party may qualify as a member of the extreme right-wing populist party family, but again, it has not received sufficient media coverage in order to locate it in political space. At first sight, the Dutch configuration is peculiar in that cultural liberalism and anti-immigration stances do not form a dimension, but are both situated above the state-market divide. This is due to all parties, with the exception of the VVD, rejecting tough immigration policies. Even the VVD has tempered its position compared to its firm anti-immigrant stance throughout the 1990s. Parties differ in significant ways with respect to cultural liberalism, however. In conjuncture with the lack of differentiation regarding immigration policies, this explains the somewhat unusual location of the immigration category. PvdA, SP and VVD subscribe to the universalistic principles embodied in the cultural liberalism category, while the

Christian Democrat CDA opposes them (the D66 has received insufficient coverage in the media to determine its position). In other words, none of the mayor parties exhibits a consistently traditionalist-communitarian position.

Party positions along the state-market dimension differ more, on the other hand. While the VVD remains the most market liberal party, the CDA took a similarly free-market position in this election. But the main dynamic takes place on the political left: Despite the PvdA remaining firmly anchored on the left, the Socialist Party (SP) opposes economic liberalism even more fervently. GroenLinks (GL) is situated similarly, but differs in its emphasis, above all opposing budgetary rigor. Just like in Germany, the absence of a right-wing populist party seems have resulted in the state-market dimension regaining importance in the most recent Dutch elections, in which the Socialist Party more than doubled its voter share. In Germany, the decline of cultural conflicts results from the deliberate strategies of the established left and right, involving a polarization to crowd out the extreme right whenever the immigration issue emerged, but centripetal competition whenever it was off the agenda (see Bornschier forthcoming a). In the Netherlands, the major parties also colluded after the success of Pim Fortuyn in 2002 (see Kriesi and Frey 2008), but the inability of a right-wing populist party to entrench itself also seems to result from the failures of these parties themselves.

## Conclusion

Covering thirty years of party politics in six West European countries, the findings presented in this article clearly reject the hypothesis that politics after the decline of the historical cleavages is shaped by rapidly evolving issue agendas and populism. Rather, the transformation witnessed by these party systems within the last three decades reflect, first, the rising diffusion of universalistic values since the 1960s, resulting in societal changes that have triggered a first redrawing of political space. Secondly, these transformations carry the imprint of a – delayed – traditionalist-communitarian counter-reaction against this development. The New Left and the extreme populist right, the two party families that are both the driving forces and the product of this two-fold transformation of political space, lie at opposing poles of the new cultural divide opposing libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-

communitarian values. With the state-market divide retaining much of its power, the space of West European politics is clearly two-dimensional. New data from recent elections show that, even if the two dimensions coincide to varying degrees from election to election, economic and cultural divides have not been merged into a single dimension of conflict.

At the same time, to which degree the two dimensions polarize party systems depends on the strategies of the political parties composing them. Where a right-wing populist party was able to assert itself in the crucial years of the 1990s, the divide between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of community remained vibrant. Far from being single-issue parties, right-wing populist parties in France, Switzerland, and Austria – as well as elsewhere in Europe – have succeeded in creating a comprehensive traditionalist-nationalist political subculture that leads its adherents to interpret politics in cultural, and not in economic terms (see also Bornschier forthcoming a). Similarly, where an established party of the right has undergone a transformation into a right-wing populist party, as in the case of the Swiss SVP or the Austrian FPÖ, it is unlikely that the split within the right should be reversible. After all, these parties have gained substantial voter shares by politicizing the new cultural conflict, and by placing renewed emphasis on economic policy making or other political issues, they would only play into the hands of their mainstream competitors.

In Germany and in the Netherlands, on the other hand, established right-wing parties have catered the immigration issue only temporarily. In conjuncture with the mainstream left not engaging in a strongly adversarial strategy implying a strong endorsement of multiculturalism against their right-wing competitors, no right-wing populist party was able to institutionalize. As a consequence, the established right was free to back off from its harsh anti-immigrant stances. Cultural conflicts therefore centre on libertarian-universalistic values and manifest themselves in tempered form in the mid-2000s. This account nuances the assertion that the convergence of the mainstream parties fosters, while a mainstream right party that leaves little room to its right limits the success of the populist right (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, Abedi 2002, Luebbers et al. 2002, Carter 2005). Crowding out the populist right occurs as a conjuncture of the established right temporarily taking a tough stance on immigration,

and the established left avoiding ideological stretching, thereby downplaying the immigration issue. My account is thus more in line with Meguid's (2005) approach.

Partly as a consequence of the decline of the cultural conflict, economic issues have proven more important in structuring recent party divisions in Germany and the Netherlands, and have given rise to significant parties off the left-wing mainstream. Given the fact that the modernization processes of the past decades have been both economic and cultural, and have created "winners" and "losers" in both terms, this is hardly surprising. So far, however, party systems with firmly entrenched right-wing populist parties have escaped this dynamic, and it is likely that politics will continue to evolve in a path-dependent manner in the two contexts. It is too early to judge which of the two camps Britain is likely to adhere to in the future. The Conservatives have put harsher immigration stances on the political agenda and have also mobilized widespread Eurosceptic sentiments, but the absence of a right-wing competitor leaves either of the two routes open to them – that followed by the Union parties in Germany or the one chosen by the Swiss People's Party.

## Notes

(1) I would like to thank the participants of the second phase of the research project "National political change in a globalizing world", namely, Marc Helbling, Dominic Höglinger, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Bruno Wüesch in Zurich, as well as Martin Dolezal, Swen Hutter, and Edgar Grande in Munich, for sharing their new data with me. Special thanks goes to Bruno Wüesch for his help in preparing the data. Furthermore, I thank Kevin Deegan-Krause and Zsolt Enyedi, as well as two anonymous reviewers for their most valuable comments and suggestions. It goes without saying that I exempt them from the responsibility of any remaining errors.

(2) Extreme right-wing populist parties from the 1990s on can be distinguished from other parties by virtue of three commonalities: (i) a location at the traditionalist-communitarian extreme of the new cultural divide; (ii) a populist anti-establishment discourse, in which they draw a dividing line between themselves and the established



parties, and (iii) a hierarchical internal structure which sets them apart from pluralist parties. It is only for the sake of brevity that I occasionally drop the label “extreme” in identifying these parties.

(3) Following Kitschelt’s (1994) as well as Flanagan and Lee’s (2003) usage, I use the term “libertarian” to denote a *culturally* liberal position compatible with an interventionist state, and not as an all-embracing call for a minimal state, as in Nozick’s (1974) conception.

(4) While some of the New Social Movements of the left have also showed affinities to communitarian thinking, their conception of community emphasizes individual autonomy based on universalistic values, and thus refers to quite different strands of communitarian thought than those outlined here.

(5) The earliest time-point for France is 1988 because presidential elections there are less frequent than the parliamentary ones analyzed in the other cases. This turns out to be fortunate due to the country’s role as a forerunner of the developments found later in other countries.

(6) The position of the Free Democrats (FDP) in terms of the state-market cleavage is unexpected and due to their strong advocacy of budgetary rigor. The latter’s location, in turn, is due to the fact that budgetary rigor was more strongly endorsed by the SPD and Ecologists than by the Union parties in this election. Because the Left Party did not strongly advocate its reservations regarding budgetary rigor, it is (misleadingly) located close to the “budget” category (see explanations in the research design section).

## References

- Abedi, Amir (2002). Challenges to established parties: The effects of party system features on the electoral fortunes of anti-establishment parties. *European Journal of Political Research* 41, 551-583.
- Allardt, Eric (1968). Past and Emerging Political Cleavages. In Otto Stammer (Ed.),

- Party Systems, Party Organizations, and the Politics of New Masses, Beiträge zur 3. Internationalen Konferenz über Vergleichende Politische Soziologie, Berlin, 15.- 20. Januar 1968* (pp. 66-76). Berlin: Institut für politische Wissenschaft an der Freien Universität Berlin.
- Antonio, Robert J. (2000). After Postmodernism: Reactionary Tribalism. *American Journal of Sociology* 106(2), 40-87.
- Betz, Hans-Georg (2004). *La droite populiste en Europe: extrême et démocrate?* Paris: Autrement.
- Betz, Hans-Georg, and Carol Johnson (2004). Against the current - stemming the tide: the nostalgic ideology of the contemporary radical populist right. *Journal of Political Ideologies* 9(3): 311-327.
- Birnbaum, Pierre (1996). From Multiculturalism to Nationalism. *Political Theory* 24(1), 33-45.
- Bornschier, Simon (2005). Unis dans l'opposition à la mondialisation? Une analyse de la convergence programmatique des parties populistes de droite en Europe. *Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée* 12(4), 415-432.
- Bornschier, Simon (2008). France - the model case of party system transformation. In Hanspeter Kriesi, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier & Tim Frey, *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization* (pp. 77-104). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bornschier, Simon (forthcoming a). *Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right. The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Bornschier, Simon (forthcoming b). National political conflict and identity formation: The diverse nature of the threat from the extreme left and from the extreme populist right. In Dieter Fuchs & Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Eds.), *Cultural Diversity, European Identity and the Legitimacy of the EU*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Budge, Ian, Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Volkens, Andrea, Bara, Judith & Tanenbaum, Eric (2001). *Mapping Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945-1988*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Carter, Elisabeth (2005). *The extreme right in Western Europe. Success or failure?* Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Cole, Alexandra (2005). Old right or new right? The ideological positioning of parties of the far right. *European Journal of Political Research* 44(2), 203-230.
- Coxon, Anthony P. M. (1982). *The User's Guide to Multidimensional Scaling*. London: Heinemann Educational Books.
- Dolezal, Martin (2008). The design of the study: the distinguishing characteristics of our approach. Hanspeter Kriesi, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier & Tim Frey, *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization* (53-74). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Eatwell, Roger (1989). Right or Rights? The Rise of the »New Right«. In Roger Eatwell & Noël O'Sullivan (Eds.), *The Nature of the Right. American and European Politics and Political Thought since 1789* (pp. 3-17). Boston: Twayne Publishers.
- Flanagan, Scott C., & Lee, Aie-Rie (2003). The New Politics, Culture Wars, and the Authoritarian-Libertarian Value Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. *Comparative Political Studies* 36(3), 235-270.
- Golder, Matt (2003). Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe. *Comparative Political Studies* 36(4), 432-466.
- Habermas, Jürgen (1985). *Die neue Unübersichtlichkeit*. Frankfurt am Main:

- Suhrkamp.
- Ignazi, Piero (1992). The silent counter-revolution: Hypotheses on the emergence of extreme right-wing parties in Europe. *European Journal of Political Research* 22, 3-33.
- Ignazi, Piero (2003). *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth (2008). What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-Examining Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases. *Comparative Political Studies* 41(1), 3-23.
- Jahn, Detlef (1999). Der Einfluss von Cleavage-Strukturen auf die Standpunkte der skandinavischen Parteien über den Beitritt zur Europäischen Union. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 40(4), 565-590.
- Johansson, Karl Magnus, & Raunio, Tapio (2001). Partisan responses to Europe: Comparing Finnish and Swedish political parties. *European Journal of Political Research* 39, 225-249.
- Kitschelt, Herbert (1994). *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kitschelt, Herbert, & McGann, Anthony J. (1995). *The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Kleinnijenhuis, Jan, & Pennings, Paul (2001). Measurement of party positions on the basis of party programs, media coverage and voter perceptions. In Michael Laver (Ed.), *Estimating the Policy Position of Political Actors* (pp. 162-182). London: Routledge.
- Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Volkens, Andrea, Bara, Judith, Budge, Ian & McDonald, Michael D. (2006). *Mapping Policy Preferences II. Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Eastern Europe, European Union, and OECD 1990-2003*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter, Grande, Edgar, Lachat, Romain, Dolezal, Martin, Bornschier, Simon, & Frey, Tim (2006). Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: six European countries compared. *European Journal of Political Research* 45(6), 921-956.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter, Grande, Edgar, Lachat, Romain, Dolezal, Martin, Bornschier, Simon, & Frey, Tim (2008). *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter, & Frey, Tim (2008). The Netherlands: a challenge that was slow in coming. In Hanspeter Kriesi, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier & Tim Frey, *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization* (pp.154-182). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Luebbbers, Marcel, Gijsberts, Mérove, & Scheepers, Peer (2002). Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research* 41, 345-378.
- Mayer, Nonna (2007). Comment Nicolas Sarkozy a rétréci l'électorat Le Pen. *Revue française de science politique* 57(3-4), 429-445.
- Meguid, Bonnie M. (2005). Competition Between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success. *American Political Science Review* 99(3), 347-359.
- Minkenberg, Michael (2000). The Renewal of the Radical Right: Between Modernity and Anti-modernity. *Government and Opposition* 35(2), 170-188.
- Minkenberg, Michael, & Perrineau, Pascal (2007). The Radical Right in the European Elections 2004. *International Political Science Review* 28(1), 29-55.
- Mudde, Cas (1999). The Single-Issue Party Thesis: Extreme Right Parties and the

- Immigration Issue. *West European Politics* 22(3), 182-197.
- Mudde, Cas (2007). *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nozick, Robert (1974). *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Oesch, Daniel (2008). Explaining Workers' Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland. *International Political Science Review* 29(3), 349-373.
- Pennings, Paul, & Keman, Hans (2003). The Dutch Parliamentary Elections in 2002 and 2003: The Rise and Decline of the Fortuyn Movement. *Acta Politica* 38, 51-68.
- Rabinowitz, George B. (1975). An Introduction to Nonmetric Multidimensional Scaling. *American Journal of Political Science* 19(2), 343-390.
- Rawls, John (1971). *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Sacchi, Stefan (1998). *Politische Potenziale in modernen Gesellschaften. Zur Formierung links-grüner und neokonservativer Bewegungen in Europa und den USA*. Frankfurt/New York: Campus.
- Taylor, Charles (1992 [1989]). *Sources of the Self. The Making of Modern Identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Walzer, Michael (1983). *Spheres of Justice. A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*. New York: Basic Books.

## Titles of Figures (to be found in separate files)

Figure 1: Political Space in Austria, Switzerland, and France, 1970s

Figure 2: Political Space in Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands, 1970s

Figure 3: Political Space in Austria, Switzerland, and France late-1980s/early-1990s

Figure 4: Political Space in Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands, 1990s

Figure 5: Political Space in Austria, Switzerland, and France, 2000s

Figure 6: Political Space in Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands, 2000s




Figure 1: Political Space in Austria, Switzerland, and France, 1970s




Figure 2: Political Space in Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands, 1970s




Figure 3: Political Space in Austria, Switzerland, and France  
late-1980s/early-1990s




Figure 4: Political Space in Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands, 1990s






Figure 5: Political Space in Austria, Switzerland, and France, 2000s




Figure 6: Political Space in Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands, 2000s